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CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW FEDERAL
DIVERSITY STATUTE: A DENIAL OF JUSTICE
ROBERT A. KESSLERt
On July 25, 1958, Public Law 85-554 went into effect.' This statute
constituted a significant revision of Title 28 United States Code, sec-
tions 1331 and 1332, the sections which confer diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction upon the federal district courts. Formerly, the federal
courts had jurisdiction in controversies between "citizens" of different
states, or between citizens of a state and foreign citizens or countries,
in any action in which the amount in controversy exceeded the sum
of $3000. A corporation had long been judicially regarded as a
"citizen" of the state of its incorporation within the meaning of the
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University.
1. 72 Stat. 415 (1958) which provides:
AN ACT
Amending the jurisdiction of district courts in civil actions with regard to
the amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 1331 of
title 28 of the United States Code is amended to read as follows:
"§ 1331. Federal question; amount in controversy; costs
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.
"(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a
statute of the United States, where the plaintiff is finally adjudged to be
entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $10,000, computed
without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may
be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interests and costs, the
district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose
costs on the plaintiff."
SEC. 2. That section 1332 of title 28 of the United States Code is
amended to read as follows:
"§ 1332. Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
"(1) citizens of different States;
"(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof; and
"(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
"(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a
statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case
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section,2 and hence subject to the same diversity jurisdiction as
private individuals.
Public Law 85554 made two significant changes in the traditional
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the federal courts. In the first
place, it raised the jurisdictional amount from $3000 to $10,000, 3 and
added as a sanction to its new minimum limit a provision allowing
the district court to deny costs to a successful plaintiff who recovers
less than that amount, or even to award costs to the defendant, if in
its discretion, this seems to be merited.4 In the second place, the
statute expressly provided not only that a corporation "shall be
deemed a citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated," but
also a citizen "of the State where it has its principal place of
business."5
The purpose of both changes is clear. They are designed to reduce
the workload of the federal courts by diminishing the number of
originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to
recover less than the slum or value of $10,000, computed without regard
to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged
to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may
deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the
plaintiff.
"(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title,
a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business.
"(d) The word 'States', as used in this section, includes the Territories,
the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."
SEC. 3. This Act shall apply only in the'ease of actions commenced
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 4. The first two items in the chapter analysis of chapter 85, title
28, United States Code are amended to read as follows:
"1331. Federal question; amount in controversy; costs.
"1332. Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs."
SEC. 5. (a) Section 1445 of title 28 of the United States Code is
amended by adding at the end thereof a new paragraph as follows:
"(c) A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's
compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court
of the United States."
(b) The caption at the beginning of such section, and the reference to
such section in the analysis at the beginning of chapter 89 of title 28,
are amended by striking out "Carriers; nonremovable actions" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "Nonremovable actions".
2. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), as amended by 72 Stat. 415 (1958).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1332(b), as amended by 72 Stat. 415 (1958).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c), added by 72 Stat. 415 (1958). It is to be observed that
the amendment makes it clearer than under the old statute that a corporation
incorporated in more than one state is to be regarded as a citizen of each state
from which it has received a charter.
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cases which may be originally brought there. Further, since the
changes also affect the "removal" jurisdiction of these courts, they are
likewise designed to reduce the number of cases which, commenced in
state courts, may be transferred for trial to these federal courts. The
legislative history of the new amendment makes these ends evident to
even the firmest epistemological Missourians.7
Congress felt that such a cut in accessibility to the federal courts
was necessary because of the "heavy increase" 8 in cases since the
end of World War II. As the "Statement" of the Senate Report
accompanying the bill puts it:
In the years following World War II the judicial business of
the United States district courts increased tremendously. Total
civil cases filed are up 75 percent and the private civil business
has more than doubled in the districts having exclusively Federaljurisdiction.
Most of the increase has occurred in the diversity of citizen-
ship cases, which have increased from 7,286 in 1941 to 20,524 in
1956. A large portion of this caseload involves corporations. Of
the 20,524 diversity of citizenship cases filed in the district courts
during fiscal 1956 corporations were parties in 12,732 cases, or
62 percent. This percentage is almost identical with the fiscal years
1951 and 1955.1
And, as shown by the statement of Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Attorney
of the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics of the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts:
One of the principal aims of these proposals is to alleviate the
crowded conditions in the district courts which have been preva-
lent for the last decade by eliminating the fling of cases which
concern controversies purely local in nature, though one of the
parties may be a corporation chartered in another State, and by
curtailing the filing of suits involving lesser values through an
increase in the jurisdictional amounts.10
As indicated by the Senate Report, Congress adopted this aim as
its own. The Report states:
In adopting this legislation, the committee feels that it will
bring the minimum amount in controversy up to a reasonable
level by contemporary standards and that it will ease the work-
load of our Federal courts by reducing the number of cases in-
volving corporations which come into Federal district courts on
the fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists.11
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by 72 Stat. 415 (1958), cross referenced to
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
7. See S. Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, 12-13 (1958).
8. Id. at 3, 12.
9. Id. at 2-3.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Id. at 3.
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As suggested, the provision making a corporation a citizen not
only of its state (or states) of incorporation but also the state in
which it has its principal place of business had, as its special target,
the corporation formed in one state (usually Delaware) to do business
wholly in another. As the Senate Committee 2 pointed out, a cor-
poration has long been regarded as a "citizen" of its state of incor-
poration regardless of the residence of its shareholders, directors and
officers, or of the place where it actually does business. Accordingly,
since the district courts have jurisdiction (where the matter in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum) in all civil actions
between "citizens of different states," a corporation organized in
Delaware, for example, to do business only in Missouri could, if it
chose, sue its significant Missouri debtors in the federal court. This
privilege was denied to an otherwise identical corporation doing
business in Missouri, if it were imprudent enough to have secured its
charter from the latter state instead of a foreign one. The Senate
Committee considered this to be "neither fair nor proper,' 13 and in
fact an "evil,"' 4 and the purpose of the new amendment was to "elimi-
nate""s all such local corporations as subjects of federal diversity
jurisdiction.
It is interesting to note that before passage of the statute as finally
enacted, even more stringent curtailment of the jurisdiction of federal
district courts was considered. Proposals were studied to raise the
jurisdictional limit as high as $15,000,10 and to deny completely fed-
eral court access to all corporationsY.1 The Committee on Jurisdiction
and Venue of the Judicial Conference even examined the possibility
of abolishing diversity jurisdiction altogether.'8
In the view of some people, the final enactment was, therefore,
not as drastic as it should have been, and at least as to one of its
facets, will be of only negligible value in accomplishing the avowed
end of litigation reduction which Congress intended. According to
the Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue, the increase in jurisdic-
tional minimum to $10,000 is expected to decrease the amount of
12. Id. at 4. Cf., Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1287, 1294 n. 48 (1958), stating
that prior to the 1958 amendment a corporation was not a citizen at all, but
that its shareholders were conclusively presumed to be citizens of the state of
incorporation. The distinction seems practically unimportant.
13. Note 7 supra, at 4.
14. Ibid.
15. Note 7 supra, at 5.
16. Id. at 32.
17. Id. at 11-13. Fears of the unconstitutionality of such a drastcally dis-
criminatory measure as H.R. 2516, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), apparently figured
in its rejection. Id. at 12.
18. Note 7 supra, at 17-20.
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civil litigation by only 7.2 per cent, considering both diversity and
federal question cases."" Restricting "removal" cases by the same
dollar limitation will only add 2.2 per cent to that total.20 Thus the
total effect of the higher jurisdictional minimum will be less than a
10 per cent reduction in federal caseload.21 While some may argue
that "every little bit counts," a 10 per cent reduction in a caseload
of over 50,00022 would hardly seem significant, except for those poor
litigants whose claims do not total $10,000, and who therefore are
completely denied access to federal courts. Certainly, it is of neg-
ligible value if Congress' real purpose is effectively to "ease the work-
load of our Federal courts. '23
The result of the amendment making corporations citizens of their
states of incorporation and also of the states in which they have their
principal place of business looks superficially more significant. As
was indicated in the Senate Report, corporations were parties in 62
per cent of the diversity cases in 1956.24 Of these, almost all (57.9%
of all diversity cases) involved a non-resident corporation doing busi-
ness in the state. In fact, such corporations accounted for 23 per cent
of all civil cases.2- Manifestly, if all of these were eliminated the
caseload reduction would be drastic. However, pleadings prior to the
1958 amendments did not have to show the principal place of business
of a corporation to establish proper "jurisdictional facts," but only
its state of incorporation. -5 Therefore reliable estimates of the num-
ber of "spurious" foreign corporations which will be denied access
to the federal courts as a result of the new law cannot be made. The
Senate Committee reported:
Figures assembled as the result of a recent survey, while show-
ing considerable variation, indicate that from 3.6 to 23.5 percent
of such cases will be eliminated. 27
Mr. Spaniol of the Administrative Office feels that a "small but sub-
stantial number of cases will be affected, ' 2 As its report indicates,
19. Id. at 30.
20. Ibid.
21. This is a maximum figure. Based on the 1956 caseload, the combined re-
duction will probably only be 8%. See note 7 supra, at 15.
22. Note 7 supra, at 13-14.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 3, 13.
25. Id. at 14. This is hardly surprising because of service and venue require-
ments, and hence is no proof that "spurious" foreign corporations are particularly
responsible for the federal court congestion.
26. Note 7 supra, at 5.
27. Id. at 6, and table at 14.
28. Id. at 14.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the Senate Committee, relying on the same figures, apparently feels
that as many as 23.5 percent of all corporate diversity cases may be
eliminated. The impression thus conveyed as to the possible efficacy
of the new amendment in cutting down the workload of the federal
courts may seem a convincing argument for the wisdom of the legis-
lation. But careful analysis shows that it will only diminish the total
number of civil cases by less than 6 percent, 9 even at this most opti-
mistic assessment of its effect.
According to the Judicial Conference's Committee on Jurisdiction
and Venue even the more radical proposal, ultimately rejected, that
a corporation be considered a citizen of every state in which it does
business (as opposed to only the state of its incorporation and the
place where its principal business is carried on) would only reduce
the overall civil caseload by 17 percent.30 It would seem reasonable,
therefore, to assume that the total effect of the change regarding
corporations will be considerably less than the above figure of 6 per-
cent, which is concededly a maximum.3 1 Thus, the effect of the cor-
poration amendment is of even less importance than that raising the
jurisdictional limit, which, according to Mr. Spaniol's summary of the
Judicial Conference Committee's conclusion, "would not appreciably
lessen the work load on the Federal courts. ' '3 2
The combined effect of both changes can therefore mean no more
than a 16 per cent reduction of the total district court caseloa', and
will probably be considerably less than that.33 One might well.ques-
29. Since such cases make up only 25% of the civil caseload, id. at 13, the total
percentage reduction (25% x 23.5%) is 5.9.
30. Note 7 supra, at 20.
31. See note 29 supra.
32. Id. at 15.
33. The accuracy of this prediction seems borne out by the experience for the
1959 fiscal year (ending June 30, 1959). The percentage decrease for all districts
in all civil cases filed was only 13.9. For the 86 districts having only federal juris-
diction it was only 16.8%. 1959 Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts Ann. Rep. 80 [hereinafter cited as 1959 Ann. Rep.]. These
figures of course, reflect decreases from all causes, and not solely from the in-
crease in jurisdictional amount and double corporate citizenship. E.g., the phe-
nomenal decrease (48%) in Texas was due to the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1445
(see note I supra) restricting removal of workman's compensation cases to the
federal courts. 1959 Ann. Rep. at 83. Excluding Texas, and thus giving a more
accurate picture of the effect of the two changes herein criticized, the overall
civil case reduction was 13.6%. Ibid. See also, id. at 88. The burden of the re-
duction was of course heavy on diversity cases. In the 82 districts having only
federal jurisdiction (excluding the four atypical Texas districts from the total
86), the percentage decrease was 27.1. Ibid. It is to be observed that the Admin-
istrative Director expects the drop in the overall caseload to be only a temporary
one. See id. at 93. This would suggest the wisdom of some more satisfactory
solution than that undertaken. See also, Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1287 (1958),
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tion the wisdom of the new statute solely on the practical grounds of
its inappropriateness to achieve the purported end.
Apart from this, both changes are basically objectionable since
they really constitute nothing but an elaborate form of "buck-
passing." The volume of litigation throughout the country has in-
creased, just as the population has, and probably for that very reason.
Stripped to its bare truth, the curtailment of federal diversity juris-
diction is merely an attempt to shift the burden of that increased
litigation onto the states. The amendments are designed simply as
a substitute for the appointment of new judges to the federal bench.
As pointed out in the Senate Report quoted above, Congress has only
increased by 51 the number of federal judges since World War 11. 34
This increase is hardly earthshaking.15
Any federal legislation which has as its motive both the robbing
of the citizen (here, of his access to the federal courts), and a refusal
to pay (here, the amount necessary to establish a sufficiently large
federal judiciary) is doubly suspect. The means chosen to accomplish
this already dubious end compound the felony. Concededly, the in-
crease in jurisdictional amount may be justified on the ground that
$10,000 today is only worth what $3000 was when that limit was
enacted. But there can be no valid justification, even on Congress'
own premises, for making the cut through an attack on corporations.
In the first place, even apart from the issue of "buck-passing" to
the states, the small savings in judicial time from a curtailment of
corporate access to the federal courts, coupled with the fact that the
percentage of corporation cases has not increased in the past few
citing the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts earlier
Quarterly Rep. 12 (Nov. 15, 1958), reporting a 25% decline in district court
filings in August and September, 1958, but cautioning that the period may not be
typical, and even if it is, projected filings in two more years will again exceed
dispositions, and hence the relief from congestion afforded by the statute is only
temporary.
34. Note 7 supra, at 3.
35. State statistics for the comparable period are not readily available. How-
ever, the 21st Ann. Rep., N.Y. Judicial Council 30 (1955), indicates that in the
period from January 1, 1937 to December 31, 1954, the number of New York
State judges increased by 40. When the number of judges in only one state
(albeit the most populous) in a roughly comparable period has increased almost
as much as that of the entire federal judiciary whose function is to serve 50,
Congress may well be accused of failing to do its duty to an expanding nation
by establishing only 51 new federal judgeships. When, in addition, the $22,500-
cost, 28 U.S.C. § 135, of each new district court judgeship created is compared
with total government expenditures (during 1959) of $150,000 every minute, and
this relative cost is weighed against the consequences of the complete denial of
justice to a number of Americans which will result from the new amendment,
the conclusion is inescapable that restricting access to the federal courts is not
a proper solution to the problem.
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years (and actually may be diminishing) makes highly questionable
any special discriminatory treatment of corporations even when they
are plaintiffs actively seeking the benefits of federal jurisdiction.
Congress decided to retain diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, presumably for the reasons given in the Report of the Com-
mittee on Jurisdiction and Venue of the Judicial Conference, which
was incorporated into the Senate Report."' Although the Committee
gives a number of reasons, and answers a number of objections to the
continuance of the diversity jurisdiction 3 7 its reasons boil down to
one, i.e., a litigant is more apt to obtain justice in the federal courts
than in many state courts. The federal procedure, the Committee
feels, is superior. The more careful choice of juries, the greater power
given to the judge, the lower expense to litigants, all are features of
this superior federal practice. The principal concern of the Com-
mittee, however, was the avoidance of local prejudice. This, the
original reason for diversity jurisdiction, seems clearly the main
justification to the Committee for its retention. The Committee
Report states:
It has been argued by those who would abolish the Federal
diversity jurisdiction that in our modern highly integrated Amer-
ican society there no longer exists the prejudice in the courts of
one State against parties who are citizens of other States, which
was one of the basic reasons for the establishment of the diver-
sity jurisdiction when the Federal courts were first created.
Although, from the nature of the problem, there can be no objec-
tive evidence as to the truth of this assertion, there is a great
bulk of expert opinion from those who litigate in the courts
that local prejudice continues to exist, and that the Federal courts
are in truth a strong protection against it.38
The Committee cites a Missouri district court decision as proof of
its thesis of the necessity for, and the efficacy of, federal jurisdiction
in coping with the problem of prejudice. The decision, which was
against the New York Central Railroad, was reversed on appeal
because of plaintiff counsel's remarks which constituted "'an appeal
to sectional or local prejudice'."' 3 9
If the real reason for federal diversity jurisdiction is the avoidance
of prejudice, as apparently Congress feels it to be, why deny it to
corporations, the principal victims of prejudice? If "buck-passing"
must be done, should not those excluded from federal jurisdiction be
those less needful of its protection?"' If, as Congress suggests, it is
36. Note 7 supra, at 9.
37. Id. at 17-20.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Ibid.
40. For example, would not a sounder basis of exclusion from federal juris-
diction be all contract cases, since in such cases prejudice is less likely to be
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the foreignness of a corporation that creates the prejudice which
makes the corrective of federal jurisdiction necessary, it would seem
unrealistic to assume that a jury will be less prejudiced against a
foreign corporation which does a major portion of its business in a
state than against one which does not. On the other hand, if, as is
more likely, the cause of prejudice is merely the bigness of the cor-
poration involved, should a corporation be protected from prejudice
only in those states where it is least likely to litigate, i.e., those states
other than its principal place of business? If Congress is serious in
its reasons for preserving diversity jurisdiction, corporations should
be singled out for special treatment, but in contradistinction to the
present amendment, it should be for special favoritism, rather than
discrimination. Corporations, as peculiar objects of prejudice, should,
if anything, be given easier access to the federal courts than that
formally provided by the old diversity statute.
Ill-advised as the new legislation thus appears (when considered
from the point of view of foreign corporations themselves attempting
to invoke federal jurisdiction), the new provisions become absolutely
insupportable when viewed from the standpoint of an individual at-
tempting to sue as a corporate defendant.
THE JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM AND CORPORATIONS
Just as most laymen regard the Bill of Rights as a direct protection
to them from all governmental encroachment, state as well as federal,
so do most also regard the jurisdiction of the federal courts as nation-
wide. Of course, as every lawyer knows, both beliefs are erroneous.
Just as the Bill of Rights is only applicable to the states so far as
carried over by the fourteenth amendment, so, although Congress
could make the jurisdiction of every district court nationwide, it has
not chosen to do so, except in a few special cases. In general, the
jurisdiction of a federal district court is no more extensive, in terms
of ability to adjudicate over a particular defendant, than is that of
the state courts of the state in which the federal court sits.41 Some
federal courts have even held that they are more limited in territorial
sweep than local courts.42
Nonetheless, Congress has power which the states lack to allow
the jurisdictional hand of federal courts to sweep beyond state
prevalent than in the typical tort case? One businessman dealing with another,
even if it be a foreign corporation, is less likely to exact local sympathy than an
innocent victim of a big foreign corporation's tort.
41. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) restricting service of process, except where
otherwise provided by federal statute, to the state in which the district court is
located.
42. See 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 740 n. 85 (1960).
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boundaries. As every law student knows, a court must have juris-
diction over a defendant to render a judgment which will be binding
upon him. "Tobago cannot rule the world, 43 unless Tobago has the
defendant somehow within its jurisdictional grasp. Probably the
principal virtue of federal jurisdiction is its ability, as yet largely
unexplored, to bring different defendants in widely separated parts
of the country within the jurisdictional hand of a single court for
decision of a single (though multi-party) controversy in one lawsuit.
If jurisdiction is the hand within which a plaintiff must be able to
grasp a defendant in order to succeed with his lawsuit, service of
process is the essential muscle to cause that desired manual response.
Jurisdiction and service are the initial problems facing any lawyer
commencing suit. They often prove the final problem, in both senses
of the word. Federal service of process is generally as limited as that
of a state court,44 and federal courts are also circumscribed by mone-
tary, "diversity," and venue requirements more stringent than those
of a state court of general jurisdiction. Therefore no real means of
overcoming this initial problem has been given to litigants in federal
as opposed to state courts.
If Able who lives in State A desires to sue Baker who lives in
State B it is probably not unfair to place the onus on him to go to
State B to commence that suit. Normally, he will have to do so even
if he wants to avail himself of the federal courts. Able cannot gen-
erally use his own state courts, and access to the federal courts in his
own state is equally foreclosed.
Where Able desires to sue not only Baker from State B but also
Charley from State C, his problems are compounded. Unless both
Baker and Charley can be "found" in the same state, Able is almost
certain to be unable to sue them both in one action. This would cer-
tainly be a desirable area for the intervention of federal jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, Congress has declined to make it available in all but
a few specialized types of cases. Able is left as remediless under
federal procedure as under that of the states which are constitution-
ally prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over persons unless their
"contacts" with the state are such as to render the exercise of that
jurisdiction "reasonable."45 And those contacts must be quite sub-
stantial, amounting to at least a simulated actual presence in the
state before the exercise of jurisdiction does become "reasonable."
Generally, therefore, a foreign corporation must be "doing business"
43. Paraphrasing Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East. 192,
194, 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (K.B. 1808).
44. See Note 41 supra.
45. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 74 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
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in a state before in personam jurisdiction either state or federal may
be exercised over it there.46
The plaintiff's jurisdictional problem has been alleviated to some
extent in two ways, both, however, on the state level rather than
through any expansion of the potentially unlimited federal jurisdic-
tion. The jurisdictional problem was first eased by dispensing with
the necessity of suing both Baker and Charley. In other words, Able
was allowed to sue only one or the other in many instances in which
it would ordinarily seem that both should be defendants and share
liability. Clearly if Able could recover his full damage from either
Baker or Charley he would not be denied justice. Even though Baker
or Charley-whichever one was caught-might feel that he was
unfairly treated because he had to pay the full amount of the plain-
tiff's claim and would often be unable to recover from the other the
amount he rightly should have paid, it was apparently felt that this
was a better solution to the problem than extending the jurisdictional
grasp of any court, even the federal, to enmesh both defendants in
the same suit. The legal devices used to accomplish this boil down to
easily memorizable rules. Joint tort-feasors are not indispensable nor
even conditionally necessary parties; joint obligors under a con-
tract are only conditionally necessary parties, i.e., if one is outside
the jurisdiction of the court the action may proceed for the full
amount against the other alone, etc.4 1 Thus, the jurisdictional problem
is by-passed. Since Able cannot sue both Baker and Charley, the law
will decree that in most instances he need not sue both.
The other means to alleviate the jurisdictional problem was the use
of fictions; regarding a defendant as though he is physically present
46. According to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
a court may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction where there are present "such
contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in
the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to
defend the particular suit which is brought there." Id. at 317. The same standard
is enunciated in the more recent case of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957). An additional requirement is, of course, the likelihood of
adequate notice to the defendant of the pendency of the suit. Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U.S. 13 (1928). Even if less definite "contacts" would be constitutionally
sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction under this standard, the states
have normally required that a corporation be "doing business" within their
territory before such jurisdiction would be taken. See, e.g., Mazzotti v. W. J.
Rainey, Inc., 31 Del. Ch. 447, 77 A.2d 67 (1950) ; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,
220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). And generally, the federal courts are bound
by the decisions of the states in which they sit on this matter. See 1 Barron &
Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 42, at 696 and n. 96. Additionally, for proper venue,
a corporation actually must be doing business, or at least be licensed to do so,
in the district of suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) (1958).
47. See Clark, Code Pleading 373-74, 376 (2d ed. 1947).
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within a state, i.e., within its jurisdictional grasp, even when he is
not. Examples, of course, are statutes making out-of-state motorists
liable to suit in states they visit, for accidents occurring there;4
statutes making non-resident businessmen liable to suit in states
where they do business on claims arising out of that business ;10 and
statutes subjecting domiciliaries to suit in their home states even
though they presently reside elsewhere. 50
For these reasons, state court procedures are normally adequate to
secure justice for an injured plaintiff, if not always to all defendants.
Therefore, Congress has generally been content to allow federal juris-
diction to mirror that of the state in which the federal court sits, and
has not met with severe criticism for so doing.
An ordinary suit against a single corporate defendant will then
not prove much more of a burden today than previously. If the
plaintiff is from the same state as that in which the corporation does
its principal business, access to the federal courts with whatever
procedural advantages that may mean will be denied, but there will
always be a state court available, often only a few blocks away. Since
many states have now patterned their procedure on that of the federal
rules5l the difference will be insignificant. The fact that in the average
case there will be no real increase in a plaintiff's burden may well
have influenced Congress in its decision to make the change in the law.
Strangely enough the problem of multiple claimants has caused
more difficulty than that of multiple wrongdoers. If Able and Baker,
each from a different state, both have a share in a single claim against
Charley from still another state, or if it is a question of who, Able
or Baker, has the one claim against Charley, or even if Able is really
suing on Baker's behalf, Charley deserves the assurance that if he
is compelled to pay Able the full amount he will not later also have
to pay Baker. Baker, too, deserves the assurance that he will be paid
that to which he is entitled, no matter who has commenced the lawsuit.
The requirement that suits be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, the provisions for interpleader, and the rule that
joint obligees are indispensable parties are all merely attempts to
48. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), upholding the validity of the
Massachusetts statute. See also, N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 52, a typical statute.
49. See Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). See also, e.g., the
New York and Massachusetts statutes, respectively, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 229-b,
and Mass. Gen. Laws c. 227, § 5A (1948).
50. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), upholding the validity of a
Wyoming statute. See also, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 235.
51. According to Sunderland, Cases and Materials on Code Pleading 16 (3d ed.
1953), Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey, New Mexico and Utah have adopted all or
a large proportion of the federal rules, while Iowa, Missouri, South Dakota and
Texas have incorporated many of the features of this apotheosis of code pleading.
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protect Charley from this danger of having to pay twice, while assur-
ing Baker that he will get whatever is his due even though he has
not chosen to start the lawsuit himself.
Able's customary privilege of making Baker a defendant if he does
not choose to become a plaintiff - is, of course, a means of protecting
all the parties involved. This is in accord with the manifest demand
of justice that the rights of Able, Baker and Charley, be concluded
in the one lawsuit. However, it is often rendered nugatory by the
jurisdictional problem. Here, Baker and Charley are both defendants
again. But here, quite often, neither of the two aforementioned meth-
ods for avoiding the jurisdictional problem is available. Both Baker
and Charley, each from a different state, are indispensable to the
lawsuit. Ordinarily, only one is within the jurisdictional grasp of
any one state. Thus, ironically, the willing plaintiff is absolutely
denied justice in the state courts. This situation would seem a much
more persuasive reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction than
that of possible local prejudice in a suit which could be brought in
either a state or federal court.
Yet Congress has acted to correct this (as international lawyers
would undoubtedly correctly characterize it) shocking "denial of jus-
tice" resulting from the "unwilling plaintiff" in only three important
types of cases; liability under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 53
interpleader,5' and shareholders' derivative suits.5 Under special
statutes the "unwilling plaintiff" can be forced to litigate even though
he is outside the normal jurisdiction of the district court in which
the action is brought. For example, section 16 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 which is designed to prevent short-swing
profits by corporate insiders on the sale of securities, expressly author-
izes an owner of securities in the corporation to commence suit "in
the name of and in behalf of the issuer" if the issuing corporation
refuses to bring the action itself, or fails to diligently prosecute it
once brought. Section 27 allows suit in any district wherein any act
or transaction constituting a violation of the statute occurred, "or in
the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or
52. Clark, op. cit. supra note 47, at 358. See also, id. at 354.
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1958).
54. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1958).
55. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1695 (1958). There are, of course, other federal statutes
which bear on a shareholder's right to bring action in behalf of his corporation
which also attempt to alleviate service and venue problems. See, e.g., Investment
Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 844, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1958), and the interrpeta-
tion given to this section in Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959).
However, these statutes are of limited applicability.
56. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
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transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any
other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever
the defendant may be found."' 7 Thus the unwilling plaintiff, the cor-
poration in whose behalf the action is brought, (an indispensable
party for the reasons indicated above)6 8 can be caught in the juris-
dictional sweep of the same district court which acquires jurisdiction
over the real defendant, the wrongdoing insider.
Similarly, the Federal Interpleader Acts9 allows a stakeholder to
bring an action against two or more adverse claimants (or potential
claimants) for money or property valued at $50060 or more, to compel
them to litigate to determine which (if any) should be paid by the
nominal plaintiff.
Title 28 United States Code, section 1397 allows the action to be
brought "in the judicial district in which one or more of the claimants
57. See note 53 supra. This includes the district where a stock exchange on
which the securities were sold was located. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
58. The indispensability of the corporation would seem to follow from the gen-
eral principle that the corporate beneficiary of a shareholder's action must be
a party to any suit in its behalf. The matter of corporate indispensability does
not seem, however, to have been passed upon in section 16(b) suits, perhaps be-
cause the ease of serving the corporate defendant has made a "test case" un-
necessary.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958), which provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person,
firm, or corporation, association, or society having in his or its custody or
possession money or property of the value of $500 or more, or having
issued a note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument of
value or amount of $500 or more, or providing for the delivery or payment
or the loan of money or property of such amount or value, or being under
any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more, if
(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in
section 1332 of this title, are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such
money or property, or to any one or more of the benefits arising by virtue
of any note, bond, certificate, policy or other instrument, or arising by
virtue of any such obligation; and if (2) the plaintiff has deposited such
money or property or has paid the amount of or the loan or other value of
such instrument or the amount due under such obligation into the registry
of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court, or has given bond
payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with such surety as
the court or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon the compliance by
the plaintiff with the future order or judgment of the court with respect
to the subject matter of the controversy.
(b) Such an action may be entertained although the titles or claims of
the conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identi-
cal, but are adverse to and independent of one another.
60. The low jurisdictional limitation on the amount in controversy, only one-
twentieth of that in normal diversity cases, is to be noted.
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reside," and Title 28 United States Code, section 2361 allows service
of process on claimants in any district. Thus, here again Congress
provides a method for solving the problem of the unwilling plaintiff.
The provisions regarding stockholders' derivative actions are also
an attempt to meet the problem of the unwilling plaintiff in this
special type of lawsuit. Title 28 United States Code, section 1401
allows such an action to be brought in "any judicial district where
the corporation might have sued the same defendants," and Title 28
United States Code, section 1695 allows process to be served on the
corporation in whose behalf the action is brought "in any district
where it is organized or licensed to do business or is doing business."
All three of these statutes have been enacted with provisions to
meet the plaintiff's problem in securing jurisdiction over a party who
should properly be a plaintiff but does not wish to be. The Securities
Exchange Act and the Interpleader Act also, incidentally, make it
easier for the plaintiff at his option, to join additional parties as
defendants besides the unwilling plaintiff. This added advantage is,
it will be observed, not available under the provisions designed for
the benefit of shareholder-plaintiffs in derivative actions. 61 Clearly,
corporations may be involved in all three of these types of actions,
and, of course, at least one will always be a party in the last. Unfor-
tunately, at least in suits of the latter two kinds, the beneficial purpose
of enabling suit despite an unwilling corporate plaintiff may be frus-
trated to a large extent. The reason for this unfortunate result is,
of course, the very reason for the new amendment; the diversity of
citizenship requirement of federal jurisdiction as that requirement
has been interpreted by the courts.62 Congress apparently only con-
sidered the effect of its legislation on corporations seeking the benefits
of federal jurisdiction as real plaintiffs.63 It failed to consider the
61. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1958), which only allows extraordinary service
upon the corporate beneficiary, with the provisions for nationwide service on all
defendants found in 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958) (as to interpleader), and 48 Stat.
896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958) (as to Securities Exchange Act violations).
62. No defendant may have the same citizenship as any plaintiff in an ordinary
diversity action since the decision in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806). It is to be observed that such a strict interpretation is not necessarily
required of the Court's constitutional power over "all cases ... between citizens
of different States." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The Strawbridge case has, however,
been uniformly adhered to for over 150 years.
63. S. Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958) makes it abundantly clear
that Congress really considered the problem only of a foreign corporation seeking
the jurisdiction of the federal courts as a plaintiff. The Report justifies the new
legislation as follows:
This fiction of stamping a corporation a citizen of the State of its in-
corporation has given rise to the evil whereby a local institution, engaged
in a local business and in many cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its
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disastrous effect which its legislation will probably have on individual
plaintiffs who must make corporations parties or fail completely in
the vindication of their rights.
The new amendment will not affect federal jurisdiction in Secu-
rities Exchange Act cases, since these do not require diversity of
citizenship. The new amendments may, however, result in an effective
denial of justice in both interpleader and derivative actions, since
both of these do require diversity of citizenship. Fortunately, the
diversity requirement has not been as stringently interpfeted in
interpleader cases by all courts as it has in other types of cases,
including shareholders' actions.
Traditionally, where an action is brought under the statutory im-
plementation of article III, section 2 of the Constitution which pro-
vides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases "between citizens
of different States" the courts have required "complete diversity,"
i.e., that no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.
Thus Able from State A could sue Baker from State B, and Charley
from State C, but could not join Abigail from State A as a third
defendant.
Fortunately, the diversity requirements in interpleader actions
under Title 28 United States Code, section 1335 are not so stringent.
The Supreme Court, in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,64 has allowed
a suit in just such a situation as that outlined above, even though
under normal diversity rules it would be impossible, at least where
the plaintiff Able is a disinterested stakeholder, i.e., the action is one
denominated "strict interpleader." A more recent case from the Fifth
Circuit has allowed suit in even a more radical departure from the
normal diversity requirement. Haynes v. Felder"0 allowed a suit by
a Texas plaintiff against five defendant claimants only one of which
was from a state other than that of the plaintiff. This was allowed
even though that one (a citizen of Tennessee) got whatever rights he
might have had jointly with three of the Texas defendants and hence
litigation into the Federal courts simply because it has obtained a cor-
porate charter from another State. (See Black and White Taxicab and
Transfer Company v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 48 S.Ct. 404, 72 L.Ed. 681 (1928). This circumstance can
hardly be considered fair because it gives the privilege of a choice of
courts to a local corporation simply because it has a charter from another
State, an advantage which another local corporation that obtained its
charter in the home State does not have .... It appears neither fair nor
proper for such a corporation to avoid trial in the state where it has its
principal place of business by resorting to a legal device not available to
the individual citizen. Ibid.
64. 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
65. 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957).
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was not adverse to them. The court held that such "minimal diversity"
was sufficient under the interpleader statute.
Thus it would seem that even if Able in the above illustration were
to sue Baker, Charley and Abigail, he might join Betty also from
State B (Baker's state) without defeating jurisdiction. As Moore
summarizes the rule:
It has been rather definitely settled that if there is diversity of
citizenship between two adverse claimants the co-citizenship of
another rival claimant will not defeat jurisdiction under the
Act.66
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the subject
of "minimal diversity," such as was present in the Haynes case. It
has also not spoken on the subject of the propriety of jurisdiction
where Able, rather than being a mere stakeholder, himself asserts an
interest in the subject-matter of the suit, in such a situation as that
in the Haynes case. In other words there is still doubt about whether
a plaintiff may bring an action under the statute where he is both
interested in the result, and not diverse from all the defendants. 7
In the Treinies case the Supreme Court expressly reserved decision
on the propriety of a suit under the statute where Able from State A
was suing Baker from State B and also Betty from State B. Such a
suit, however, would seem to be clearly precluded by the statute,
which only allows a suit against "two or more adverse claimants, of
diverse citizenship as defined in section 1332."68
If the Supreme Court supports such holdings as that in the Haynes
case, the addition of any claimant from another state will save federal
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, there will undoubtedly be an unfortunate
diminution in access to federal courts as a result of the new amend-
ment to the diversity statute. In the above situation, among others,
not only will jurisdiction under the interpleader statute be precluded
where Baker and Betty are both corporations incorporated under the
laws of State B, but also, even if one is not a State B corporation,
but merely does its principal business in that state.
Fortunately, where the new jurisdictional amount is met, suit in
such a case will probably still be possible under non-statutory inter-
pleader.,' Also, fortunately, interpleader often involves a fund or res,
and hence states are constitutionally competent to adjudicate the
rights of all the unwilling plaintiffs to the subject of the action even
66. 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1 22.09, at 3033 (2d ed. 1948).
67. Id. at 3029.
68. Ibid.
69. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 (2) ; 1 Barron & Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 42, § 48.
The amount in controversy will, however, have to be the prohibitive $10,000,
rather than the $500 permitted for statutory interpleader.
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though not all of these parties are personally within the jurisdictional
grasp of the court. 0 No such "out" is available in the case of stock-
holders' derivative suits. It is, therefore, in this area that the worst
effect of the new legislation will be felt.
SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS AND THE NEW AMENDMENT
Shareholders' derivative actions, suits against disloyal directors
and officers of a corporation to hold them accountable to the corpora-
tion for the benefits of their breach of trust, despite the fact that the
corporation, naturally enough, refuses to sue, have long posed both a
policy and a procedural problem. The latter at least is in part com-
pounded by what were considered necessary concessions to the former.
Regulation of such suits is, like most legal problems, a task of
balance between two possible abuses. The "strike suit," the suit
brought merely to harass or more probably to be "bought off" at a
healthy profit, is too despicable to be characterized as less than black-
mail. On the other hand, the prospect of a shareholder whose corpora-
tion is completely at the mercy of a corrupt, self-dealing management
is equally unattractive. It is no mean task to devise a law which will
give adequate protection to minority shareholders while at the same
time preventing the unscrupulous from commencing "strike suits."
Unfortunately, many jurisdictions seem to be more afraid of "strike
suits" than of the exploited shareholder. The problems of a share-
holder. desiring to bring such a suit in a state court are considerable.
Certain formal conditions precedent must be met-for instance, prior
demand on the directors,71 and sometimes the shareholders ;12 or ex-
cuses given for failure to observe the technicalities. Further, under
statutes in many states, and even under the common law of many
others, the plaintiff must have been a shareholder at the time of the
70. See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Pennington v. Fourth
Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). See also
Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 98, 102, 103 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957) ; Restate-
ment, Judgments § 32 (1942). Compare New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241
U.S. 518 (1916).
71. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Bartlett v. New York, N.H.
& H. R.R., 221 Mass. 530, 109 N.E. 452 (1915); Baker & Cary, Cases and Ma-
terials on Corporations 619 (3d ed. 1959); Ballantine, Corporations 345-46 (rev.
ed. 1946); Lattin, Corporations 352-55 (1959); Stevens, Corporations 800-03
(2d ed. 1949).
72. See, e.g., Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955);
Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 71, at 619. The prohibitive expense to the
plaintiff shareholder where such a demand on the body of shareholders is required
is obvious.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss3/2
FEDERAL DIVERSITY STATUTE
alleged wrongs complained of, 73 or as the New York statute (and
also the federal rule) puts it, his shares must "have devolved on him
by operation of law" thereafter.74 Needless to say, such a require-
ment may effectively bar not only the blackmailer, but also the good
faith purchaser who discovers too late that management has been
"milking" the corporation.
An even more onerous requirement is that of "security for ex-
penses," pioneered by New York, and copied by a number of other
states.75 The New York statute is typical.78  It provides that the
plaintiff (or plaintiffs) must post "security for the reasonable ex-
penses, including attorney's fees," which may be incurred by the cor-
poration and also by the defendant directors, officers and employees
of the corporation.7 7 The plaintiffs may avoid posting this security
only if they hold a total of 51% of the outstanding shares of some class
of the corporation's stock, or if the value of the stock they hold is
over $50,000.
Needless to say, the likely costs of the corporation and the defen-
dants in defending the suit will probably be quite significant. 78 The
73. The leading case denying a subsequent shareholder's right to sue even in
the absence of a statute is Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W.
1024 (1903). See Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 71, at 350-51, 352. As to statutes
requiring contemporaneous ownership, see Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 71,
at 632-33; Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 71, at 357-59; Stevens, op. cit. supra
note 71 at 810-15.
74. Fed. R, Civ. P. 23 (b) ; N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61. For other states having
similar statutes, see Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 71, at 632; Lattin, op. cit.
mupra note 71, at 356 n. 35.
75. See generally, Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 71, at 638-42; Ballantine,
op. cit. supra note 71, at 374; Lattin, op. cit. supra note 71, at 384-88; Stevens,
op. cit. supra note 71, at 810, 815-18.
76. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §61-b. For other such statutes, see Lattin & Jennings,
Cases and Materials on Corporations 773 (3d ed. 1959). Such state statutes are
applicable to diversity actions brought in the federal courts. Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
77. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §61-b expressly provides that security must be given
"for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which may be incurred
... by the other parties defendant.. ." for which the corporation "may become
subject pursuant to section sixty-four of this chapter... ." N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law
J 64 provides for indemnification of directors, officers and employees made defen-
dants in such shareholders' actions, "except in relation to matters as to which it
shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding that such officer, director or
employee is liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties."
But, even though a completely successful plaintiff will thus get the security de-
posit back, there is no provision for gauging the size of deposit by the plaintiff's
likelihood of success. This defect has been corrected in the California Act. Cal.
Corp. Code Ann. § 834 (Deering Supp. 1959). See Lattin, op. cit. supra note 71,
at 885-86.
78. Thus security in the sum of $50,000 was required under the New York
statute in Donovan v. Queensboro Corp., 75 F. Supp. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
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expenses of defense will probably increase in direct proportion to the
plaintiff's likelihood of success. Thus, it would be quite logical under
such statutes to require the highest amount of security where the
defendants are the most crooked7 9 The greatest protection is thereby
offered to the greatest wrongdoers. Thus, not only "strike suits," but
perhaps even more so, legitimate shareholder attempts to vindicate
corporate rights against corporate wrongdoers are discouraged by
being made economically impossible.
There is a further problem, which may discourage the bringing of
legitimate stockholder suits even more. A serious question arises as
to whether those shareholders necessary to meet the 5% or $50,000
requirement to avoid the security posting must also meet the require-
ment of being shareholders at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.
The issue is as yet unsettled. A New York case" has held that suit
might be maintained, without security, by one plaintiff who held his
stock contemporaneously with the transaction complained of where
he was joined by a group of other plaintiffs and the combined share-
holdings were sufficient to make up the 5 % or $50,000 necessarr, even
though the latter were not shareholders at the time of the alleged
wrongdoing. On the other hand, in what is clearly an erroneous
decision but may nonetheless be the law, a federal court has held that
where a state has such a security requirement all shareholders neces-
sary to make up the minimum required to avoid it must also have
been shareholders at the time of the illegal transaction.8, Thus, the
possibility of shareholders' suits may be even further reduced in
jurisdictions which have both conditions, and choose to make the
security requirement doubly burdensome by adding the contempora-
neous ownership requirement to it.
It can hardly be disputed that there are significant obstacles con-
fronting a shareholder trying to bring a derivative action. But diffi-
cult as these are to overcome, they are minor when compared with
that of securing jurisdiction over all the indispensable defendants.
As usual, the problem of the "unwilling plaintiff," securing jurisdic-
79. Compare, however, Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 834 (Deering Supp. 1959); note
77 supra.
80. Noel Associates v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
See also, Baker v. McFadden Publications, 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
Contra, Richman v. Felmus, 8 App. Div. 2d 985, 190 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1959), criti-
cized in 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1427 (1959).
81. Kaufman v. Wolfson, 136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The decision
seems clearly incorrect in that it violates the policy of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which dictates that the result in the federal court
must be the same as it would be in the appropriate state court. However, a later
New York intermediate appellate court case agrees with the Kaufman decision.
See note 80 supra.
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tion over the corporation for whose benefit the action is brought, is
the most difficult.
The case of Dean v. Kelloggs- is typical of the jurisdictional prob-
lem facing shareholders who bring such an action in the state courts.
The plaintiffs were shareholders in a Nevada corporation. They
brought suit in Michigan in behalf of their corporation and a Dela-
ware corporation against the Kellogg Company, a Delaware corpora-
tion doing business in Michigan, and two individuals, John L. Kellogg,
an Illinois resident, and W. K. Kellogg of M\Iichigan.
Needless to say, only the defendant W. K. Kellogg and the Kellogg
Company, the two parties which could be found in the state of suit,
were served. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed a dismissal of
the complaint by the lower court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over "essential parties." The court held that both the Nevada and
Delaware corporations in whose behalf the suit was brought were
indispensable parties, and since neither had been personally served
in Michigan, even though neither could be, the suit had to be dis-
missed. By the time the appeal had terminated it was too late for the
plaintiffs to bring the action elsewhere,83 and hence the plaintiffs, and
the other shareholders of the corporation were forever barred from
questioning the propriety of the real defendants' conduct on the merits.
The court felt restrained by constitutional limitations from pro-
ceeding without in personam jurisdiction (i.e., personal service within
the state), and hence rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the cause
of action constituted a sufficient "res" to allow an adjudication of the
corporations' rights, without having the corporations personally be-
fore the court. The court held that personal jurisdiction was neces-
sary for two reasons, those suggested above on a more general policy
level: (1) recovery must run in favor of the corporation, (2) the de-
fendants must be protected from later suit by the corporation on the
same cause of action.81
It could be argued that neither of these grounds is sufficient from
a constitutional law point of view to insist upon in personam juris-
diction. The corporation can be protected (the first ground) by
simply providing by statute that the judgment will run to the corpo-
rate beneficiary, whether or not it is a party. The defendants can be
protected (the second ground) without personal service on the cor-
82. 294 Mich. 200, 292 N.W. 704 (1940).
83. Dean v. Kellogg, 394 Ill. 495, 68 N.E.2d 898 (1946). As to the federal
courts, see Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903).
84. These grounds are the ones traditionally asserted for considering the bene-
ficiary corporation an "indispensable" party, as it is almost universally held to be.
See Baker v. Cary, op. cit. supra note 71, at 690; Ballantine, op. cit. supra note
71, at 366-67; Lattin, op. cit. supra note 71, at 359-60; Stevens, op. cit. supra note
71, at 803-10.
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poration, by a procedure analogous to "vouching to warranty," or the
notice to the title disputer in early ejectment, notifying the corpora-
tion to appear or be barred from any future action on the same cause
of action. 5 However, such amelioration on the state level, would un-
doubtedly require the passage of express statutes on the subject, some-
thing which to date has not been done. The Michigan court was,
therefore, correct in its conclusion that, under present law, adequate
protection of all parties (symbolized by the requirement of indispen-
sability of the unwilling corporate party) required that a suit in
which the beneficiary corporations were not personally bound parties
had to be dismissed. Dean v. Kellogg, of course, represents the pre-
vailing view that the corporation, even though an unwilling beneficiary
(plaintiff), is an indispensable party. It must be personally served
before jurisdiction to decide the real issue-culpability of corporate
officers and directors to the total body of shareholders-may be deter-
mined.88
As a result, just as in the Dean case, many shareholder suits are
impossible in state courts, since often not even one of the guilty
parties resides in the same state as that in which the necessary cor-
porate parties are incorporated or do business sufficient to make them
amenable to service.8 7 Also, the greater the number of "real" defen-
dants, and the more corporate beneficiaries, the less likely is the
plaintiff to find any state court which will have adequate jurisdiction
over all those who should be made parties to the suit.8
It should be noted that the problem, although less likely to be
85. See Winer, Jurisdiction over the Beneficiary Corporation in Stockholders'
Suits, 22 Va. L. Rev. 153 (1935) ; N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 233-36 (1941) ;
Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 71, at 650. See also, Cohen v. Dana, 287 N.Y.
405, 40 N.E.2d 227 (1942), providing a possible solution to the problem of the
non-resident corporation. But see the unfortunate ultimate result, Cohen v. Dana,
83 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd 275 App. Div. 723, 87 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1949).
86. Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 71, at 690; Ballantine, op. cit. supra note
71, at 366-67; Lattin, op. cit. supra 71, at 359-60; Stevens, op. cit. supra note 71,
at 803-10.
87. As to the necessity of a corporation's doing business in a state before that
state can exercise in personam jurisdiction over it, see note 46 supra.
88. It should also be noted that another practical difficulty, in addition to the
unwilling plaintiff problem, also presents itself as a result of the jurisdictional
limitations on state courts. As indicated above, all "real" defendants are not as
necessary as one might offhand.suppose in most lawsuits, and this is true also
in shareholders' suits. E.g., in the Dean case the suit was not dismissed because
real defendant, John L. Kellogg, was not served, since the other real defendants,
The Kellogg Company and W. K. Kellogg, were. Where the wrongdoing director
and the beneficiary corporation are in two different states, as in the Dean case,
the plaintiff is stymied. However, where there are two or more wrongdoing di-
rectors, he may be equally stymied as a practical matter if only a "judgment-
proof" one is in the same state as that in which the corporation may be found.
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troublesome in the case of "local corporations" organized in one state
to do business only in one other "foreign" state, may be present even
here. The offending director, the real defendant, may still not be
amenable to service in the one state where the corporation actually
does business, thus making suit impossible.
Although a few states have made ingenious attempts to solve the
jurisdiction problem," the disadvantages, including cost and uncer-
tainty of result, are enough, without considering such standard bur-
dens as the contemporaneous share ownership and security deposit
requirements, to discourage even the most hardy from bringing deriv-
ative actions.
Federal jurisdiction, therefore, by and large represents the only
effective safeguard to shareholders from negligence and breach of
trust on the part of corporate management. Even before the present
amendments, however, a suit in the federal courts was no panacea to
shareholders desirous of protecting their corporations from looting.
In the first place, a shareholder is met by the contemporaneous owner-
ship requirement of Rule 23(b) (1). 90 Requirements of state law,
including security deposit statutes of the state of the forum, are also
carried over01 and as indicated, have been interpreted in a more
heavy-handed fashion than by the enacting states.9 "
There are then the three customary barriers to an action in the
federal courts, failure to hurdle any one of which will prove fatal to
the action. They are, of course, the problem of jurisdiction, in the
89. See Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 71, at 650-51.
90. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) provides:
Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action brought to enforce a
secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in an association,
incorporated or unincorporated, because the association refuses to enforce
rights which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be veri-
fied by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the
time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share there-
after devolved on him by operation of law and (2) that the action is not
a collusive ofie to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of any
action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. The complaint
shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure
from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the share-
holders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain
such action or the reasons for not making such effort.
The rule thus expressly requires contemporaneous ownership of stock at the time
of the alleged wrongdoing (or devolution on the plaintiff by operation of law),
plus a demand on the directors or a showing that such demand would be futile,
plus a demand on the stockholders (or some adequate excuse) where state law
requires such a demand. See 2 Barron & Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 42, at § 565
and cases there cited.
91. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
92. Kaufman v. Wolfson, supra note 81.
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case of shareholders' suits the peculiar problem of "diversity jurisdic-
tion," the problem of venue, and the problem of service of process.
In 1936 an amendment to the Judicial Code was enacted"- which
was designed to make the plaintiff's task easier. It combined a
provision allowing the venue to be that of any district "where the
corporation might have sued the same defendants," with an authori-
zation that process might be served on the corporation "in any
district where it is organized or licensed to do business or is doing
business." The effect was, of course, to obviate the service problem2 4
Although the wrongdoing party could still be served only in the state
where he was found, the corporation need not be found (i.e., incorpo-
rated in, or doing business) 9 in the same state. This, of course, over-
93. 49 Stat. 1213 (1936) which provided:
AN ACT
To amend section 51 of the Judicial Code of the United States (U.S.C.,
title 28, sec. 112).
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 51 of the
Judicial Code (U.S.C., title 28, sec. 112) is amended to read as follows:
SEC. 51. CIVIL SUITS; WHERE TO BE BROUGHT.-Except as
provided in the five succeeding sections, no person shall be arrested in one
district for trial in another, in any civil action before a district court;
and, except as provided in the six succeeding sections, no civil suit shall
be brought in any district court against any person by an original process
or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant;
but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is
between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the
district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant; except
that suit by a stockholder on behalf of a corporation may be brought in
any district in which suit against the defendant or defendants in said
stockholders' action, other than said corporation, might have been brought
by such corporation and process in such cases may be served upon such
corporation in any district wherein such corporation resides or may be
found.
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (f) provides:
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. All process
other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute
of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that
state. A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided in
Rule 45.
The law in effect prior to the promulgation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) in 1937 was
no less restrictive. See 2 Moore, Federal Practice 4.42 n. 2 (2d ed. (1948).
Thus, in the normal case a defendant is no more amenable to service in a
federal court than he would be in the courts of his own state. Where a corpora-
tion was not incorporated or doing business in the same state as that in which
the real defendants could be served suit was, therefore, effectively foreclosed.
The 1936 Amendment corrected this situation.
95. A corporation may of course be served in the state of its incorporation
since even if it does not do business there, state corporation laws universally
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comes the principal difficulty encountered when the action is brought
in a state court. The plaintiff need only go to the district court in
the district where he can get hold of the real defendant, and effective
service can be made on both the real defendant and the "unwilling
plaintiff," the corporation.
The problem of "complete diversity" remained, since Congress had
done nothing to alter the judicially created requirement that no one
on the plaintiffs' side of the suit could be a citizen of the same state
as any one on the defendants' side.9 6 Thus, Able from State A could
sue Baker from State B and Charley Corporation from State C.
Abigail from State A could also be a plaintiff, but if she were made
a defendant the jurisdiction would be lost.
Often, of course, the corporation will be incorporated in either the
same state as that of the plaintiff (or one of the plaintiffs), or that
require either (a) the maintenance of a "registered agent" empowered to accept
such service, see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 131 (1953); D.C. Code §§ 29-907,
29-907b (Supp. 1960) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 23, §§ 8, 96 (1957) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
55-13, 55-15 (Supp. 1957); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1701.07, 1701.88 (Baldwin
(1958); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act arts. 2.09, 2.11 (1956); Va. Code Ann. §§ 13.1-9, 13-1
11 (1956), or (b) a state official similarly empowered to validly receive process in
behalf of the corporation, see, e.g., N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 24, 25 (in such
states, required agents for service of process are, of course, available for service
in an action commenced in the federal courts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (3)), or (c)
at least a principal office, at which the plaintiff will presumably be able to find
(or at least find the whereabouts of) some corporate agent capable of accepting
valid service, see, e. ., Cal. Corp. Code § 301 (Deering Supp. 1959); Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 156, § 6 (1948); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-306 (1958).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (3) provides that service may be made:
Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other
unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name,
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a
managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appoint-
ment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one
authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by
also mailing a copy to the defendant.
Therefore, generally, all persons available for service in state actions are also
available for service in federal cases, together with such other persons who can
qualify for the rank of "managing or general agent."
96. The requirement of complete diversity entered with Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), and has been uniformly adhered to since that
decision. It is to be noted that this decision was not an interpretation of the
Constitutional provision, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, but rather of the federal
statute in force at the time. Suggestions have been made that the Supreme Court
make this fact clear. See Ancillary Jurisdiction in Third Party Practice-Rule 14,
51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 354 (1956). Such a clarification might pave the way for
an overruling of this decision, and a consequent release of federal jurisdiction
from its present strait-jacket, which manifestly is not a demand of the simple
and permissive constitutional provision granting the federal courts jurisdiction
in cases "between citizens of different states."
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of the defendant (or one of them). If shareholder Able from State A
is suing Baker from State B, in behalf of the Bubble Corporation, in-
corporated under the laws of State B, it thus becomes important to
determine whether the Bubble Corporation, although technically a de-
fendant (because an unwilling plaintiff), will be aligned as a defend-
ant or a plaintiff for testing to see if diversity exists. If the Bubble
Corporation is considered a defendant the suit may proceed, but, if a
plaintiff, suit will be impossible.
Prior to 1957, the accepted criterion for deciding on which side of
the fence a corporation belonged, was factually which side had its
(or rather its management's) sympathies. If there was "antagonism"
to the plaintiff, then the corporation was properly a defendant, and
suit in the hypothetical posed above was proper. Like most legal
words "antagonism" is a very imprecise term, and hence, until 1957,
an initial trial on the issue of antagonism had to be held. Obviously,
this requirement proved to be another in the Promethean pains of a
complaining shareholder. After a prolonged hearing on this issue, '
he might be told that the requisite antagonism did not exist (and
this might be the decision even though the corporation would not itself
sue), the corporation would be realigned as a plaintiff, and the plain-
tiff's entire efforts would have been for naught.98 Even if this prelim-
inary issue were decided in his favor, he would still be faced with
a trial on the merits in which he would have to introduce much of
the same evidence again, and might still ultimately lose on the final
issue of liability.
In 1957, the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Sperling.,* The suit
was brought in a California district court by a New York stockholder
of Warner Bros. Pictures, a Delaware corporation, against California
citizens charging a wastage of the Warner Bros.' assets, for the benefit
of one of the California defendants and United States Pictures, also
a Delaware corporation. The district court had found after a pro-
tracted hearing that since there was no fraud on the part of the
Warner directors in making the questioned contracts, but only an
exercise of independent business judgment, the management was not
really antagonistic to the financial interests of the corporation. It
97. E.g., the hearing on "antagonism" in Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957),
lasted 15 days, and the case was in the courts for over eight years solely on the
issue of jurisdiction.
98. It is to be noted that state court jurisdiction even if not originally fore-
closed due to the service problem, would often be impossible due to the bar of the
statute of limitations after such protracted federal proceedings. See Baker &
Cary, op. cit. supra note 71, at 643-46. See also, Dean v. Kellogg, 394 Ill. 495, 68
N.E.2d 898 (1946) as to this ever-present danger after any prolonged litigation
on jurisdiction.
99. Note 97 supra.
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therefore realigned Warner Bros. as a plaintiff. Since there was then
a Delaware corporation as a plaintiff, and a Delaware corporation
(United) as defendant, the suit had to be dismissed for failure of the
requisite diversity.
The Supreme Court reversed, disapproving the procedure of sepa-
rate trial of the issue of antagonism with its necessary and repetitious
examination of the merits. It held that the issue of antagonism should
be determined on the pleadings, and that sufficient antagonism is
present whenever the management refuses to sue to undo a trans-
action, or "so solidly approves it that any demand to rescind would
be futile .... 100 The dissent argued, probably overpessimistically,
that the rule laid down by the majority would greatly expand the
diversity jurisdiction.101 The result, however, was to make some
shareholders' suits possible, where, under the strictures of state
jurisdictional limitations and previous federal decisions, no forum
whatsoever would have been available to vindicate corporate rights.
If this is an evil it would not seem inconsistent with the obvious pur-
pose of Congress in enacting the 1936 amendment discussed above,
and a later provision'02 in the general venue statute03 making a cor-
poration suable in any district in which it is doing business rather
than its place of incorporation only. 0 4 Both provisions must have
been passed to make corporations more amenable to suit in federal
courts, and, at least in the case of the 1936 amendment, in precisely
this type of action.105
In any event, the relaxation of the law with regard to antagonism
only helps th6se plaintiffs who need to have the corporation as a
defendant to preserve diversity. If anything, it makes more difficult
the task of the plaintiff who must, in order to succeed, have the cor-
poration aligned as a plaintiff, since it makes more doubtful any such
realignment. In short, the decision probably does nothing to disturb
the earlier court of appeals decision in Lavin v. Lavin.106 If Able from
State A sues Baker from State B, in behalf of the Abigail Corpora-
tion, incorporated under the laws of State A, and Abigail Corporation
100. Id. at 97.
101. Id. at 98 (dissenting opinion).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391406 (1958).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958) provides:
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation
for venue purposes.
105. H.R. Rep. No. 2257, infra note 110.
106. 182 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1950). See also, 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 569 (Supp. 1959). See Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1022 (1951).
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is treated as a defendant, the action manifestly cannot proceed, since
diversity is not present. Obviously the action cannot proceed in any
state court either unless both the defendant Baker and the Abigail
Corporation can be "found" in one state (i.e., the Abigail Corporation
must be "doing business"'20 in the same state as the real defendant).
The plaintiff, and his corporation, therefore, may be totally without
remedy unless federal jurisdiction is possible. The Lavin case refused
to realign a New York corporation as a plaintiff in a suit by a New
York shareholder against real defendants all of whom were from other
states. The Sperling case, by holding that a corporation is properly
a defendant where its directors refuse to sue the real defendants, has
in effect decreed that the unwilling plaintiff corporation must always
be a defendant, since if its board of directors chose to sue there would
never be occasion for a shareholder's suit in the first place. Therefore,
the refusal of the Second Circuit in the Lavin case to realign the
corporation as plaintiff is reinforced by the Sperling decision, and
thus what is gained by way of access to the federal courts in one
instance is counteracted by losses through inability to bring suit in
others.
The last obstacle which had to be hurdled even under the previous
law, and one which has proved in some courts a greater burden than
the others, has been, surprisingly enough, that of proper venue. As
was stated above, there is a "special" venue provision for shareholders'
suits." 1 In 1948, the 1936 amendment regarding stockholders' deriva-
tive actions was split into two parts.09 The provision for service of
process on the corporation became Title 28 United States Code, section
1695, while the venue clause became Title 28 United States Code,
section 1401. Its exact wording is:
Any civil action by a stockholder on behalf of his corporation
may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the corporation
might have sued the same defendants.
107. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 74 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1956), which
requires that the defendant's relationship to the state "is such as to make the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction reasonable." In a shareholder's derivative suit,
since in personam jurisdiction over the corporation is required, this will normally
mean that the corporation must be doing business in the state where service
is to be made, and have some agent present there of such importance that notice
is likely to reach the corporation as a result of service upon him. See Insull v.
New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 273 F.2 166
(7th Cir. 1959) ; 1 Barron & Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 42, § 179. See also note
46 supra.
108. Note 93 supra.
109. 62 Stat. 936 (1948).
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Although the exact intended scope of the 1936 amendment as orig-
inally enacted is not perfectly clear, 10 it is certain that it was not
intended to make matters more difficult for plaintiffs in derivative
actions. Some courts have interpreted it in conformity with this
110. H.R. Rep. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936) states:
As amended by your committee this proposed legislation relates solely
to venue in that class of stockholders' suits brought under the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction of the Federal Courts wherein a stockholder of one
corporation brings the suit on behalf of the corporation against another
corporation incorporated in another State.
Its purpose is to plug a loophole in judicial procedure through which
holding companies and parent corporations are enabled to strip a sub-
sidiary corporation of all its assets to the loss of minority stockholders of
the subsidiary corporation without possibility of being brought to account
in any court, either Federal or State. Under the existing law with regard
to venue, if a holding company and its subsidiary corporation are in-
corporated in different States, no Federal court can entertain a stock-
holders' suit without the consent of both corporations. The State courts
are powerless in this situation because their process does not run beyond
State boundaries....
The right of a stockholder to sue on behalf of a corporation which
refuses to bring suit in its own behalf is well recognized, and the con-
ditions under which such a suit may be brought are prescribed by equity
rule 27 of the United States Supreme Court.
In a stockholders' suit to enforce rights of the subsidiary corporation
as against the parent corporation, both subsidiary and parent corporation
are indispensable parties to the suit. Both corporations appear in the
case as parties defendant. The presence of both corporations is essential
to any judicial determination of the respective rights and liabilities, and
in the absence of jurisdiction over either party the suit must be dis-
missed....
Under section 51 of the Judicial Code, where jurisdiction is founded
on diversity of citizenship, suit can be brought only in the district of the
residence of either the plaintiff or defendant. A corporation within the
meaning of this section is a resident of, and only of, the state of its in-
corporation ...
In the case here under discussion, if suit is to be brought at all in the
Federal court, it must be brought either in the district of one of the
defendants, or of the plaintiff. If either of the corporations are residents
of the same state as the plaintiff, the complete diversity of citizenship
requisite to Federal jurisdiction is lacking. The right of the stockholder
to bring the suit in the district of which he is a resident cannot be availed
of unless both corporations are nonresidents and both do business in that
district.
Should suit be brought in the state in which the parent corporation is
incorporated, the subsidiary corporation may procure its own dismissal
from the suit on the grounds that it is being sued in a State other than
that of its incorporation, such State not being the State of residence of
the plaintiff, and this is true even though the corporation is regularly
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
beneficial purpose. For example, in Montro Corp. t'. Prindle,111 the
court allowed the plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, to bring suit
in the Southern District of New York against a New York corpora-
tion in which the New Jersey corporation was a shareholder, and eight
individual directors, four of whom were residents of New York, two
of Connecticut, and one each of Kentucky and Indiana. To use the
dramatis personae of previous examples, the suit is basically one by
Able from State A against Baker from State B, Charley from State C,
and Bubble Corporation from State B, being brought in the district
court for State B.
Another federal court has not been so generous.112 It has, erro-
doing business in the State in which the suit is brought.... The suit then
fails for want of an indispensable party.
On the other hand, if the suit is brought in the State in which the
subsidiary corporation is incorporated, the parent corporation is entitled
to raise the objection that it is not being sued in the State of its in-
corporation nor in the State in which the plaintiff resides, and when
such objection is necessarily sustained, the suit again fails for want of
an indispensable party.
In either instance the plaintiff is denied access to any Federal court.
Under the amendment to section 51 of the Judicial Code proposed by
this bill, the suit would be brought in any district in which the corpora-
tion in whose behalf the suit is brought could have itself brought the
suit, and process could be served on such corporation wherever it re-
sides or may be found. For example, if the parent corporation were
incorporated in State A, the subsidiary corporation in State B, and the
plaintiff a resident of State C, the suit could be brought in State A,
and process served on the subsidiary corporation in State B.
The power of the Federal courts to maintain a suit cognizable under
the judicial power of the United States in any district, and to insure
process for service anywhere in the United States is a matter of legisla-
tive discretion, controlled by Acts of Congress based upon considerations
of convenience to litigants, expense, and promotion of justice .... [cita-
tions omited.]
The court in Schoen v. Mountain rPoducers Corp., 170 F.2d 707 (3dd Cir. 1948),
found this legislative history to "show quite clearly" that its interpretation of
the statute was correct. The court in Montro Corp. v. Prindle, 105 F. Supp. 460
S.D.N.Y. 1952), disagrees.
111. 105 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
112. Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948). It is
interesting to note that prior to 1887 there were no venue requirements. See
Kibler v. Transcontinental Western Air Inc., 63 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
In the face of such interpretations as that in the Schoen case it seems desirable
to enact a venue statute which will make it clear that it is a venue statute and
nothing more, and will also accord with the real purpose of such statutes, the
convenience of all parties, including the plaintiff. In an age of modern trans-
portation, venue rules which compel a corporation to litigate in any district of
a state in which it does business, but under which an individual cannot be com-
pelled to take a 5 minute subway ride from Brooklyn to Manhattan (Eastern
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neously it is submitted, since the section is a venue not a jurisdic-
tion provision, taken Title 28 United States Code, section 1401 to
create what is called a "double diversity" requirement, and has for-
bidden suit in State B since both Baker and the Bubble Corporation are
from the same state.113 The argument preventing suit in State B uses
the "special venue" statute as a sword, rather than a shareholder
shield, and, in effect takes it as an additional qualification on the
diversity jurisdiction. The argument runs that since the statute
authorizes suit where the corporation might bring it, it forbids suit,
where as here, the corporation could not bring it. Clearly, the cor-
poration could not itself bring suit in the federal court for B, since
then diversity would be lacking (real defendant Baker being a citizen
of B). Hence the plaintiff Able may not do so either.
Such reasoning is as valid as arguing that we may hate our friends
because we only read in the Bible that we must love our enemies.114
Although Congress allows suit in any district where the corporation
might bring it, it does not necessarily intend to preclude suit in a
district where the corporation could not bring it because of diversity
requirements. Judge Murphy in the Montro casel' correctly suggests
that the decision in Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp.16 is based
on a confusion between the separate jurisdictional and venue require-
ments of federal law. Nonetheless, since the Supreme Court has not
yet spoken, a shareholder in certain districts will find an insurmount-
District of New York to Southern District), but may, for instance, have to travel
300 miles without complaint from southern to northern Utah if he is a citizen
of that State, certainly seem to need overhauling.
113. 170 F.2d at 713, where the court stated:
We conclude that in the case of stockholders' derivative suits Section
51, as amended by the Act of 1936 and modified by Section 52, authorized
suit to be brought (a) in the district in which the plaintiff stockholder
resided, (b) in a district in the State, if any, in which all the defendants
including the injured corporation resided, and also, if there was diversity
of citizenship between the injured corporation and all the other defend-
ants (c) in the district in which the injured corporation resided or (d)
in a district in the State, if any, in which all the other defendants re-
sided. It follows that the district court was right in holding that since
diversity of citizenship was lacking between Mountain Producers and
all the other defendants the final clause of Section 51 did not authorize
the plaintiff to bring this suit in Delaware, the district of Mountain
Producers' residence. [Footnotes omitted.]
114. "Cosmus, Duke of Florence, was wont to say of perfidious friends, that,
'We read that we ought to forgive our enemies; but we do not read that we
ought to forgive our friends.'" Bacon, Apothegms No. 206.
115. 105 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
116. 170 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
able obstruction to bringing suit thanks to the "double diversity"
venue requirement. 1" 7
There is also a serious question under the same statute, without
considering the 1958 amendments, whether the venue could ever be
successfully laid in the district of the plaintiff's residence if the plain-
tiff's corporation was not doing business, or licensed to do so, in the
same district. The problem exists even if the plaintiff were fortunate
enough to "catch" the real defendants in his own state, thus satisfy-
ing the requirement of service within the state despite the fact that
they were all citizens of some other state.1 8 In such a situation venue
would in effect be laid under the general venue statute119 rather than
under the "special venue" section,120 since the corporation could not
sue in that district because it would not be the district of the real
defendants' residence. If, as Professor Moore suggests,"2' service may
only be had on the corporation out-of-state12 where the venue is laid
under section 1401, the latter section would effectively bar the suit
where venue was laid in the plaintiff's district, by making it impos-
117. It is to be noted that the Schoen case was decided by the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. Thus the "double diversity" requirement is a
binding rule in the federal courts of such important corporation states as Dela-
ware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
118. If any of the real defendants were citizens of the same state as that of
plaintiff's domicile, or if the corporation were incorporated in that state, lack of
diversity would, of course, prevent suit. See note 96 supra.
119. 28 U.S.C. 1391 (1958) which provides:
VENUE GENERALLY
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is. founded only on diversity
of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only
in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diver-
sity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where
all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for
venue purposes.
(d) An alien may be sued in any district. (June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
62 Stat. 935.)
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1958).
121. 3 Moore, Federal Practice 23.21 (2d ed. 1948).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1958) which provides:
STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE ACTION.
Process in a stockholder's action in behalf of his corporation may be
served upon such corporation in any district where it is organized or
licensed to do business or is doing business. (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62
Stat. 945.)
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sible to bring in the indispensable corporate party, through making
service upon it under section 1695 unavailable.
From this maze of requirements which the plaintiff had to meet
even under the federal law prior to the 1958 amendment, at least one
thing should be clear; there was very little hope of a shareholder's
derivative suit ever reaching a trial on the merits. Unfortunately, the
amendment making a corporation a citizen not only of its state of
incorporation but also of the state in which it has its principal place
of business can only make that dim prospect even less likely. The
service hurdle has fortunately not been directly elevated by the new
amendment. On the other hand, not only the jurisdictional but also
the venue hurdles have been raised to an even more insurmountable
height than was true under previous law.
The adverse effect on a shareholder through making the diversity
requirement more onerous is obvious. To take the simplest situation,
Able sues Baker in behalf of Corporation Charley. Even under the
old law, suit would be impossible were Charley to be incorporated in
Able's state, since Charley Corporation would be a defendant, and
the courts have not shown a tendancy to realign Charley as a plaintiff
except where to do so would defeat rather than sustain jurisdiction.
Under the new statute, jurisdiction cannot be sustained even though
Charley is not incorporated in Able's state, if it nonetheless has its
principal place of business in that state. The result, of course, is to
throw Able back into the state courts, which, because of the service
requirements of state law, will have to be Baker's state, in which
Able may well be unable to secure jurisdiction over Charley Corpora-
tion. No matter how heinous his offense Baker will thus go free.
Often a shareholder's suit will involve not only the beneficiary cor-
poration but also another corporation, the recipient of an allegedly
improvident contract (as in the Sperling case).123 In such a case, the
prospects of shareholder emasculation are multiplied, since each cor-
poration involved is "schizophrenized" into two citizens, that of its
state of incorporation plus that of its principal place of business. The
Sperling case, for example, involved a New Yorker against two Dela-
ware citizens (the two corporations) and a citizen of California. If
either one of the Delaware corporations had had its principal place
of business in New York, federal jurisdiction would not have been
possible. The more corporate parties, the more certain diversity is
to be defeated, even assuming that the fission of a corporation into
two citizens will be merely binary.
123. 354 U.S. 91 (1957). Of course, a greater number will often be involved.
See, e.g., Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948), in
which four corporations other than the beneficiary were involved.
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Unfortunately, there is no assurance that such bifurcation will be
merely binary. "Principal place of business" is not an inflexible
term. Congress felt that adequate criteria for its resolution were
available in bankruptcy precedents which rely on the same test for
jurisdiction.24 If anything, these cases show that the test, like all
questions of fact, is hardly certain. A hotel room has been held to
be a principal place of business under the latter test,12 while the
district from which the corporation derived its sole income has been
held not to be.126 There would seem to be no cogent reason why two
courts could not hold two distinct states each to be the principal place
of business of the same corporation, and with equal validity. Even
if an appellate court were to pick only one of two or more competing
places as the real principal place of business, by the time it did so,
if suit were still jurisdictionally possible, the time limitation for
bringing it might well have elapsed, or the wrongdoers have escaped
to Tobago.1 27 At the very least, of course, Congress has reinstated the
necessity for the same protracted jurisdictional hearing which the
Supreme Court only recently tried to eliminate in the Sperling case.
The resultant impediment to plaintiff shareholders is manifest. Thus,
germ-like, the menace to diversity multiplies itself, as a result of the
new statute, and with the same insidiousness destroys shareholder
rights.
As was stated above, the shareholder's race to the merits may be
lost by failure to hurdle any one of the three obstacles to federal juris-
diction (even granting that he qualifies for the race by meeting the
contemporaneous ownership requirements and, where applicable, secu-
rity for costs requirements). Therefore, even if he is not defeated
by the new jurisdictional requirement, there is still, in those courts
which require "double diversity," a doubly ihcreased bar in the form
of the added venue problem. The "double diversity" requirement, it
will be recalled, forbids suit against Baker and Charley in Baker's
district, of which the Bubble Corporation, the unwilling plaintiff, is
also a citizen, since the Bubble Corporation could not bring suit there.
In other words, under this theory the requirement is "Diversity of
citizenship between the corporate defendant and defendant directors,
124. S. Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958).
125. In re Camera, 6 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
126. Shearin v. Cortez Oil Co., 92 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1937).
127. See note 98 supra. It is also to be observed that under the bankruptcy
law, the principal place of business test is not so important. It is basically a
venue requirement, and hence the action may be transferred to the proper prin-
cipal place of business. See In re Marine Aircraft Corp., 118 F. Supp. 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), interpreting 66 Stat. 424 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 55(b) (1958).
Here, since it is jurisdictional, it may altogether defeat the plaintiff's right to
bring the action.
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in addition to such diversity between plaintiff shareholder and defen-
dants . . . ."1 Under the new amendment, even if the Bubble Corpo-
ration were incorporated under the laws of State D, rather than
State B, in the above example, the suit could still not proceed where
such double diversity is required, if the Bubble Corporation has its
principal place of business in the same state as that of any one of the
real defendants. For example, in a suit by Able from State A, in
behalf of Bubble Corporation, incorporated under the laws of State D,
but with its principal place of business in State B, suit in the federal
courts of State B would be precluded if there were any real defendant
from that state, while suit in State D's federal courts would be pre-
cluded if there were any real defendant from that state. And, of
course, it is quite likely that at least one offending director will come
from either the corporation's state of incorporation or from its prin-
cipal place of business. It will also often be essential to join a corpora-
tion as one of the real defendants, as, for example, in an action where
rescission of an improvident contract is sought.' 29 Since, as indicated
above, every corporation is now potentially two, each from a different
state, the dangers of having one of the real defendants of the same
citizenship as the beneficiary corporation are still further multiplied,
with a result similar to issuance of a statutory Writ of Prohibition
against bringing a shareholder suit in any federal court.
The combined effect of the new jurisdictional requirement and its
bearing on the double diversity requirement is to preclude suit when-
ever the beneficiary corporation is incorporated in or has its principal
place of business in the state of any one of the plaintiffs or defen-
dants. Suit is further restricted if any of the real defendants are
corporations, in the state in which any one of them is incorporated or
has its principal place of business. Thus, the new statute provides a
quaintly Malthusian geometric formula for the destruction of share-
holder rights.
Of course, shareholders of corporations incorporated in more than
one state will be very hard hit. So also will shareholders attempting
to bring "double" or "multiple" derivative suits.1'1 According to
Barron and Holtzoff, *1 "A 'double derivative' action is one in which
the beneficiary is in his turn a fiduciary and as such refuses to enforce
the right which is his as beneficiary of the first fiduciary." A "mul-
128. Montro Corp. v. Prindle, 105 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), sum-
marizing the rule of the Schoen case which it rejects.
129. Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See also, Smith v.
Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957). See 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
Procedure 61 (1950); 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 19.10 (2d ed. 1948).
130. See Lattin, op. cit. supra note 71, at 366-68.
131. 2 Barron & Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 129, at 160.
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tiple" derivative action, of course, is merely one in which there are
even more fiduciary-beneficiary relationships in the chain.
In the simplest case, shareholder Able sues in behalf of his corpora-
tion, Baker, which is itself a shareholder in Charley Corporation for
injuries done to Baker as a shareholder, through the wrongdoing of the
individuals who manage Charley. Manifestly, if either of the corpora-
tions when bifurcated into dual citizenship, as required by the new
statute, becomes a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, the suit
must be dismissed for lack of diversity. In any circuit where "double
diversity" is required the same result will also follow if either of the
bifurcated corporations becomes a citizen of the same state as the
other, or of any of the real defendants. And, of course, the mathe-
matical probabilities of such a result are greater with every additional
corporation which becomes involved.
Since the probabilities of state jurisdiction in a case involving
multi-defendants are always poor, and with multi-corporate defen-
dants are even poorer (since they must all be "doing business" in the
state to be served), the result will often be that no double, much less a
multiple, derivative suit can be brought anywhere.132
Ironically, Congress, by its new legislation, has recreated the very
"loophole" which it was the express purpose of the special venue and
service amendment of 1936133 to "plug." As the House Committee
Report to the special venue and service amendment stated:
As amended by your committee this proposed legislation relates
solely to venue in that class of stockholders' suits brought under
the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the Federal courts
wherein a stockholder of one corporation brings the suit on behalf
of the corporation against another corporation incorporated in
another state.
Its purpose is to plug a loophole in judicial procedure through
which holding companies and parent corporations are enabled to
strip a subsidiary corporation of all its assets to the loss of
minority stockholders of the subsidiary corporation without pos-
sibility of being brought to account in any court, either Federal
or State.13
For the reasons given above, the new amendment is even more likely
than was the law prior to 1936 to make suit impossible in most such
double and almost all multiple derivative actions. The multiplication
of indispensable corporate parties, coupled with what, even in the
132. Provisions for change of venue are of little value, since transfer -will not
be ordered to a district where suit could not properly have been brought origi-
nally. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 42, at 412-413.
133. This amendment is now found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1695 (1958).
134. See note 110 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss3/2
FEDERAL DIVERSITY STATUTE
simplest action, will require at least 6 different state citizenships, 135
will undoubtedly allow most parent corporations "to strip a subsidiary
corporation of all its assets to the loss of minority shareholders of the
subsidiary corporation without possibility of being brought to account
in any court, either Federal or State."136
CONCLUSION
All legislation should be a "balancing of interests"-a weighing of
the advantages of a statute against its harmful effects. The new di-
versity legislation, when weighed in the balance, is found wanting.
Certainly, there is nothing evil about a congressional attempt to
save money. Likewise, the new law is not made per se evil even
though the motive is not that the economic burden be really reduced,
but instead merely that it be shifted to the states. However, not all
of that burden can be shifted. The result of the new statute will, in
many instances, be to deny to many litigants access to any court, state
or federal, in other words, to deny justice to a number of our citizens.
The new statute will hit hard in the one area in which state courts
are particularly unable to afford redress, the problem of the unwilling,
but indispensable, plaintiff. This unwilling plaintiff is often a corpo-
ration. Yet, the new legislation especially singles out corporations
for discriminatory treatment. Persons attempting to bring inter-
pleader actions will be harmed. The harm to shareholders attempting
to bring derivative suits will be even greater.
The new legislation has thus cut down access to the federal courts
in just those areas where a plaintiff must have federal jurisdiction.
The number of persons injured may not numerically be too large.
However, the injury done to each is great. A denial of justice to even
one American would not seem worth the few-by budgetary compari-
son-dollars needed for a few extra federal judges. Even if the higher
jurisdictional amount is justified by the continuing inflation, the pro-
vision making corporations citizens of two states is not. As shown
above it will not primarily harm corporations, but rather those indi-
viduals who seek to make corporations defendants.
If federal diversity jurisdiction must be diminished, and realis-
tically it need not be, it should be cut in other areas where the harm
135. One for the plaintiff, two for each corporate beneficiary (equalling four),
and a different one for each real defendant (always a different one from the
plaintiff, and where double diversity is required, different from each corporate
defendant's possibly dual citizenship). Thus, as is unlikely in such suits, where
there is only one real defendant, and double diversity is required, the very mini-
mum is the very unlikely six state diversity.
136. H.R. Rep. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936).
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done is not so mortal. Title 28 United States Code, section 1332 (c)
should be repealed, or at the very least, exceptions should be made
which will insure that no American is denied justice from his courts. 3,
137. At least the statute should be amended to impose the dual citizenship
only when the corporation is itself a plaintiff, or at the very least, an exception
should be made for shareholder's suits. Even a statute which made federal juris-
diction available only where a state suit was impossible would be preferable to
the present law, since it would cut down the federal workload while avoiding
the complete denial of justice possible under the present statute.
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